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Foreword
By Monroe Price
What is the role of public opinion in the making of Internet policy? This seemingly simple question undergirds
an important strand of research at our Internet Policy
Observatory (IPO), part of the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication.
It is useful to determine, for example, the relationship
of public opinion to “multistakeholderism,” the reigning
model for the shaping of Internet policy. Those committed to multistakeholderism believe that the “public” is
represented through the interacting complex that encompasses government, business, and civil society.
“Public opinion” has a different vector. It can be seen
as the amalgamated desire of designated publics, variously constituted. At the same time it is “sui generis”
and therefore public opinion, in this sense, surmounts
stakeholder status. It is, at least in its ideal form, the
thing it represents itself to be. And achieving an understanding of the public and defining public opinion
is central as it is the public whose legitimating arc is
frequently invoked.
In illiberal democracies, and semi-authoritarian states,
as well, public opinion can operate as an element of
“voice” in the sense implied by Albert O. Hirschman in
Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Notice of public opinion can
serve as an early warning system of disapproval or
dissatisfaction with official policies. As a form of intelligence, it can indicate to national leaders whether
their actions are deepening loyalty or quickening the
impulse for radical change. Government and officials
shape, invoke, and follow public opinion. These factors—definitional, contextual, institutional—suggest
the significance of continuing and intense attention to
public opinion as a key variable in the global effort to
resolve questions of Internet governance.
As an important participant in international organs of
Internet governance, without question, Russia is an important theater for pursuing these inquiries about public
opinion’s role in the making of Internet policy. Russia’s
internal regime is evolving, and evolving dramatically.
The Russian government has turned to Internet policy as a means to sustain this evolution and “sell” its
autocratic model of governance to the Russian public while dampening internal and external sources of
Page 4

dissent. The Russian regime has become an initiator
of new tools and mechanisms of control, sometimes
harsh and repressive. Thus, Russia provides a useful
policy model for semi-authoritarian states attempting to
restrict Internet freedoms throughout Central Asia and
beyond. Accordingly, we have turned to Russia as locus for testing methodologies, drafting questions and
drawing forth implications on the role of public opinion
in Internet governance.
What does public opinion tell us? The report—reproduced below—is illuminating. From the perspective of
assessing the public’s demand for Internet freedom, the
results are somewhat discouraging. For example, only
a complete ban of the Internet, a la North Korea, seems
to be a motivating factor for Russians to mobilize in defense of Internet freedom - otherwise most other forms
of government censorship do not motivate the citizenry
in any actionable way. Pluralities, if not majorities, of
Russians believe the Russian government should censor online foreign media news and websites - and that
foreign countries are using the Internet against Russia.
Some key data points from the executive summary that
show the lack of support for Internet freedom in Russia - and the support for censoring especially foreign
sources of information are:
1. Almost half (49%) of all Russians believe that information on the Internet needs to be censored.
2. A plurality (42%) of Russians believe foreign countries are using the Internet against Russia and its
interests. About one-quarter of Russians think the
Internet threatens political stability (24%).
3. Large percentages of Russians do not like having
information critical of the government or calling for
political change being available online. About four
out of five Russians (81%) stated a negative feeling
toward calls to protest against the government and
changes to political leadership. Likewise, a similar
percentage of Russians (79%) feel negatively toward websites and social networking groups that
are used to organize rallies and demonstrations
against the government. Nearly three-quarters
(73%) of Russians also disapprove of negative
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information about public officials being available
online.
4. Pluralities of Russians believe a social network
group that is used to organize anti-government
protests (46%), the video by Pussy Riot (45%), the
website for the group that exposed the government
blacklist of websites (44%), and bloggers that call
for regime change (43%) should be censored by
the Russian government.
5. The Russian government and the Russian security service were virtually tied in the percentage
of Russians (42% and 41% respectively) that
cited these organizations as trusted regulators of
the Internet, though more Russians ranked the
Russian security service (17%) as their most trusted regulator of the Internet as compared to the
Russian government (13%).
6. About half of Russians (51%) believe the primary
motivation of the government legislation creating
a blacklist of websites is the maintenance of political stability as compared to 13% of Russians who
believe the primary motivation was limiting democratic freedoms.
7. The plurality of Russians (39%) believe personal
blogs should be regulated the same as mass media websites.
8. About one in five (18%) Russian Internet users
replied that they had heard about a new legal requirement that new websites should be registered
with the Russian government agency that manages online communications. Out of these Internet
users who had heard of the law, a rather large majority (70%) supported the law and a small minority
(20%) opposed it.
One of the most significant questions raised by the
study involves what assumptions to make about further
and future impact of public opinion on Internet policy.
Civil society groups and others often think of public
opinion as a residual check on authoritarian behavior
and as a reservoir of strength for the achievement of
international norms. But, as the study indicates, the
opposite may be true. Publics can lag on information
and media rights. And where both regime and public
opinion are restrictive, positive change, especially by
external actors, will be hard to achieve.

There are implications. One consequence of this line of
analysis is to question the value of focusing so heavily
on state institutions as the core area for thinking about
harmful regulation. The way in which public opinion is
shaped is significant here. The “public” is a collection of
demographics ascertained, mulled over, and refigured
by strategic players (governments, religions, NGOs
and corporations) trying to mold these segments for
their own benefit. How public opinion is retooled becomes a matter of competing strategic players affecting
allegiances—a subject I explore in Free Expression,
Globalism and the New Strategic Communication (recently published by Cambridge University Press).
Gregory Asmolov gives examples of this contest to
shape the public’s opinion: Public opinion concerning
Internet regulation is partly (perhaps largely) a function
of whether the communications environment is perceived as dangerous—a place, in the rising Russian
imagination, of suicide promotion, pornography and
cultural and moral dissipation. And, as Asmolov’s essay
suggests, officials keen on regulation can be instrumental—together with allies in society—in fostering the
sense of peril and fomenting insecurity. By so shaping
the background, public opinion is channeled towards
favoring repressive tendencies. There is a loop, then,
between shaping and invoking public opinion. The existence of this loop points toward the direction global
public policy will likely take: the need for greater attention to the significant public background views with all
the complexity that it implies in a transnational context.
This IPO study provides an important example of this
feedback loop between the fixing of ideas of peril and
the dynamic consequences for public opinion concerning freedom of expression.
Our study implies an environment of interaction—where
elements of civil society demand regulation, or are relatively indifferent to regulation or where government
prompts the conditions that provoke or spurs demand
and the government responds. And there’s a related
possibility: Professor Joseph Turow has suggested a
“sociology of resignation,” where some version of “the
public,” considering some outcome close to inevitable,
acquiesces in a far less than optimal outcome. Turow’s
context for the sociology of resignation was a tendency
to accept privacy incursions, but the concept could be
applicable to Internet content regulation. In this way,
the public becomes habituated to an environment of
control.
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I conclude with an expression of gratitude. There are
many lessons embedded in this survey of Russian public opinion, lessons of methodology, of demography and
of differential philosophies about the role of technology
and information in society. We are grateful to Dr. Olga
Kamenchuk, Director of International and Public Affairs
at VCIOM, who facilitated this research in her typically
professional manner. She had been a visiting scholar
at our Center for Global Communication Studies and
at the Annenberg Public Policy Center. Professor Erik
Nisbet of Ohio State University’s Department of Communication was instrumental as a wise counsel and
contributing his analysis to the study. Gregory Asmolov,
already acknowledged in this Introduction, is a brilliant
PhD student at LSE and a frequent contributor to our
teaching and writing programs and was a consultant on
the study. Briar Smith and Laura Schwartz-Henderson
of CGCS and the IPO, carefully and devotedly helped
steer this project from initiation to conclusion.
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Executive Summary of Survey Results
Profile of Russian Internet Users
The plurality of adult Russians may be categorized
as “heavy Internet users” who use the Internet either
every, or almost every, day (42% of the population). “Internet non-users” who report not having been online in
the last six months account for 38% of the population.
“Light Internet users” who report using the Internet occasionally to several times a week during the previous
six months are 20% of the population.
Adult heavy Internet users in Russia are young and well
educated, with 59% between the ages 18 and 34yrs of
age and nearly half (45%) having attended university.
They are equally split between men and women. Adult
Russians who do not use the Internet are predominately over 55 years of age (59%), female (59%), and a
small minority has attended university (14%).
Russian Internet users most commonly use the Internet for to search for information for personal use (63%),
communicate in online social networks (62%), and
read national news (45%). The least frequent activities include searching for friends (15%), downloading/
purchasing software or apps (15%), managing online
finances (12%), looking for employment (10%).

Primary Sources of Information
Central Russian TV dominates as the number one
source of information for 60% of all Russians and cited
one of the three top sources of information for 84% of
all Russians. Online news sites were as selected as
the primary source of information for 10% and in the
top three sources of information by 29% of Russians.
Online social networks were selected as the primary
source of information by 6% of Russians and in the top
three sources of information by 25% of Russians.
Central Russian TV (80%), online news sites (52%),
and online social networks (46%) are three most commonly cited sources of information by heavy Internet
users. Light internet users most commonly cite central
TV (82%), regional TV (41%), and either central newspapers (34%) or online news sites (35%) as within their
top three sources of information.
News on TV (90%), Russian news sources in general
(87%), and newspapers (86%) are overwhelmingly

trusted sources of information by Russians. In comparison, foreign media in general is trusted by 43% of the
population, though Internet non-users (34%) are significantly less likely to trust foreign media as compared
to heavy Internet users (45%).
Among Internet users, crowd-sourced resources such
as Wikipedia are trusted the most (81%), followed
closely by Internet publications (75%). Two-thirds
(66%) of Internet users trust online social networks as
sources of information and a bit over half (55%) trust
online forums and blogs. Tips from friends are overwhelmingly the most trusted (92% of Russians) offline
source of information about businesses and products.
Internet stores such as Amazon (67%) and online
customer reviews (67%) are the most trusted online
sources of commercial information by Russian Internet
users.

Russian Attitudes about the Influence of
the Internet and Dangerous Content
In total, about half of Russians (53%) believe the Internet has a positive influence on society while about
one-third (31%) of Russians believe it has a negative
influence. This perception varies widely by frequency
of Internet use with majorities of heavy Internet users
(76%) and light Internet users (61%) believing it has a
positive influence and a majority of non-users believe it
has a negative influence (55%).
A plurality (42%) of Russians believes foreign countries are using the Internet against Russia and its
interests. One-third (33%) of Russians believe the Internet substantially increases the rate of suicide. About
one-quarter of Russians believe the Internet threatens
family values (27%) and political stability (24%). The
perception that the Internet threatens social ties in Russia is held by 21% of Russians.
Large percentages of Russians have negative feelings
toward politically controversial content being available
online. About four out of five Russians (81%) stated a
negative feeling toward calls to protest against the government and change of political leadership. Likewise,
a similar percentage of Russians (79%) feel negatively
toward websites and social networking groups that are
used to organize rallies and demonstrations against the
Page 7
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government. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of Russians
also have negative feelings toward negative information about public officials being available online.

Russian Attitudes about Internet
Censorship
Almost half (49%) of all Russians believe that information on the Internet needs to be censored. This
percentage varies substantially by frequency of Internet
use, with 57% of non-users believing online information
needs to be censored compared to 43% of heavy Internet users who feel the same.
Copyrighted material (59%), foreign news media
websites (45%), other foreign websites (38%), and
materials promoting ethnic/racial hatred (37%) are the
most frequently mentioned categories of online content that Russians feel the government should censor.
Preferences did not vary significantly by frequency of
Internet use.
A majority of Russians (59%) believe online pornographic homosexual content should be censored by
the Russian government. Pluralities of Russians believe a social network group that is used to organize
anti-government protests (46%), the video by Pussy
Riot (45%), the website for the group that exposed the
government blacklist of websites (44%), and bloggers
that call for regime change (43%) should be censored
by the Russian government.

Russian Attitudes about Internet
Regulation
The Russian government and the Russian security service were virtually tied in the percentage of Russians
(42% and 41% respectively) that cited these organizations as trusted regulators of the Internet, though more
Russians ranked the Russian security service (17%) as
their most trusted regulator of the Internet as compared
to the Russian government (13%).
Non-users of the Internet as compared to heavy Internet
users are substantially more likely to cite government
institutions or agencies as their trusted regulators of
the Internet such as the Russian government (46% vs.
36%), Russian security service (44% vs. 37%), and the
Russian presidency (37% vs. 25%) as compared to
heavy Internet users.
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In contrast, heavy Internet users, as compared to nonusers, are substantially more likely to trust regulators of
the Internet without official ties to the Russian government such as private industry (32% vs. 18%), NGOs
and other civil society groups (27% vs. 14%), and international organizations without ties to Russian officials
(12% to 5%).
A little over one-third of Russians (35%) had never
heard or was unaware of the Russian legislation creating a blacklist of websites censored by the Russian
government, though this percentage varied substantially by frequency of Internet use. Almost half (49%)
of non-users had never heard of the law as compared
to about one-third (34%) of light users and about onequarter (23%) of heavy users.
About half of Russians (51%) believe the primary motivation of the government legislation creating a blacklist
of websites is the maintenance of political stability as
compared to 13% of Russians who believe the primary
motivation was limiting democratic freedoms. Heavy
Internet users were more than twice as likely as nonusers (18% vs. 8%) to believe the primary motivation
of the blacklist law was to limit democratic freedoms.
A majority of Russians (56%) believe the state is
obliged to consider the public’s opinion and see public advice on Internet regulation. About one-third of
Russians (36%) believe the state can consider public
opinion if it so wishes but in the end may act according to its own preferences and 9% of Russians believe
the state should not pay any attention to public opinion
when regulating the Internet.
The plurality of Russians (39%) believe personal blogs
should be regulated the same as mass media websites, 15% of Russians believe personal blogs should
be regulated less than mass media websites, and 13%
believe they should be regulated more, and 14% believe they should not be regulated at all. However, a
very large percentage of survey respondents had difficulty answering the question, with nearly one out of five
(19%) replying that it was too difficult to tell.

Russian Citizen Mobilization and Protest
Russian Internet users (62% of survey respondents)
were asked a series of questions about citizen mobilization and protest in furtherance of Internet freedom. A
majority of Russian Internet users (59%) do not believe
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the regulation the Internet affects their personal freedom while 41% believe that they are impacted by
regulation.
A small percentage of Internet users (14%) believe protests against Internet censorship occurring in their local
community are possible and about one in ten Internet
users (9%) said they would take part in such protests if
they occurred or approximately 6% of the total Russian
population.
The top reason for mobilizing in defense of Internet
freedom cited by Internet users was a complete ban
on the use of the Internet (40%). A complete ban on
the Internet in the workplace was a distant second with
11% of Internet users citing this reason. Other forms of
Internet censorship such as government being allowed
to remove any form of content (7%), ban of personal
blogs or websites of opinion, cultural, or opposition
leaders (7%), and temporarily shutting off the Internet
due to protests (7%) were cited by a very small minority
of Internet users.
About one in five (18%) Russian Internet users replied
that they had heard about a new legal requirement that
new websites should be registered with the Russian
government agency that manages online communications. Out of these Internet users who had heard of the
law, a rather large majority (70%) supported the law
and a small minority (20%) opposed it.
Russian Internet users were asked under what circumstance they would or would not support the Russian
government temporarily shutting down the entire Internet within Russia. Overall, 58% of Internet users would
be in support of such a shutdown, with the case of a
national emergency garnering the most support (48%)
followed by 9% of Internet users believing a temporary
shutdown would be justified in the case of a mass protest and 1% citing another reason. In contrast, 42% of
Internet users believe the shutdown of the Internet by
the Russian government would never be justified no
matter the situation.
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Profile of Russian Internet Users
The percentage of Russians using the Internet has
more than doubled between 2009 and 2012 growing
from 29% in 2009 to 64% in 20131. However, since
2012 the growth of Russian Internet penetration has
stagnated with no significant growth. Respondents to
the survey may be split into three segments based
on their frequency of Internet use (see Figure 1). The
largest segment is “heavy Internet users” who use the
Internet either every, or almost every, day (42% of the
population). The second largest segment is “Internet
non-users” who report not having been online in the
last six months and accounts for 38% of the population. The smallest segment is “light Internet users” who
report using the Internet occasionally to several times a
week during the previous six months (20% of the population).
As detailed in Table 1, Russians who have not accessed
the Internet in the last six months are overwhelmingly
55 years of age or over (59% of segment), are more
likely to be women (59% of segment), and are very unlikely to have attended any university education (14%
of segment). In comparison, heavy Internet users are
the mirror image of non-users in terms of age and edu1

International Telecommunication Union ICT Indicators 2014
Database

cation, with heavy Internet users likely to be thirty-four
years of age or younger (59%) and almost half attending or completing university education (45%). Also in
contrast to the other two segments, heavy Internet users are split evenly 50/50 between men and women.
Light Internet users are more similar to heavy Internet
users than non-users in terms of age and education,
with 80% of light users under the age of fifty-five years
and the plurality (40%) having attended or completed
university. However, their gender split (42% male, 59%
women) resembles non-users.
Internet users were asked about the types of online
activities they did during the last month. Table 2 lists
those activities in which at least 10% of Internet users reported participating. Among all Internet users, the
most popular activities were searching for information
for personal use (63%), communicating in social networks (62%), and reading national news (45%). The
least common activities were looking for a job (10%),
online banking (12%), searching for people with similar interests (15%), and downloading software or apps
(15%). The greatest differences in reported activities
between heavy Internet users and light Internet users
were downloading/ listening to music (45% vs. 23%),
reading forums or blogs (31% vs. 11%), and corresponding by e-mail (45% vs. 26%).

FIGURE 1: RUSSIAN FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE (percentage of total respondents)
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TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents)
Frequency of Internet Use
Demographic Category

Non-Users

Light Users

Heavy Users

Age
% 18-34 years old

6

34

59

% 35-54 years old

35

45

32

% 55 or more years old

59

20

8

% Men

42

42

50

% Women

59

59

50

% Vocational Secondary Education or Less

45

24

23

% Completed Vocational College

41

36

33

% Incomplete University or More

14

40

45

Gender

Educational Attainment

TABLE 2: ONLINE ACTIVITIES DURING LAST MONTH BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of Internet users,
mutiple responses)
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Internet Activity

% of Light
Users

% of Heavy Users

% of All Internet Users

Search for information for personal use

52

69

63

Communicate in social networks

54

66

62

Read national news

39

48

45

Correspond by e-mail

26

45

39

Download, listen to music

23

45

38

Download, view video

25

43

37

Read international news

24

35

31

Search for information for work

27

35

32

Read forums or blogs

11

31

25

Use Internet telephony (Skype, etc.)

15

27

23

Stream Internet TV

11

24

20

Play online games

13

22

19

Chat/forums/blogs

8

22

17

Online shopping

9

21

17

Read books

12

20

17

Download, purchase apps, software

9

18

15

To search for friends, people with similar interests

12

16

15

Manage bank account through the Internet

5

15

12

Look for a job, part time job, freelance

7

12

10
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Primary Sources of Offline and
Online Information
Survey respondents were asked to rank their top
three primary sources of information they relied upon
the most. Sources which garnered at least 10% of responses are presented in Figure 2 with the percentage
that selected each source as their primary, secondary, or tertiary source of information. Central TV is
by far the most popular source of information among
Russians, with 60% of Russians selecting this communication channel as their primary source of information,
17% selecting as their secondary source, and 7% as
their tertiary source – 84% of all respondents in total.
Regional TV is the next most popular source of information with 46% of Russians citing it was one of their top
three sources of information and 31% citing it as their
number one or two ranked source. Central newspapers
are the third most cited source of information with 30%
of Russians ranking them in their top three sources,
though only 5% cite them as their primary source.

In contrast, online news sites are the second most
often cited primary news source next to Central TV,
with 10% of Russians naming them as their primary
source of information and 29% placing it within their
top three sources overall. Online social networks round
out the top five most popular source of information in
Russia with 25% of all Russians citing them and 6%
of Russians naming them as their primary source of
information.
Table 3 provides the percentage of Russians that
named each source as one of their top three sources of information combined by Internet use segment.
Though Russian central TV is the most cited source
of information across all Internet use segments, nonusers were significantly more likely to cite central TV
(88%) as compared to light (82%) and heavy (80%)
Internet users. Regional Russian TV (54%) was by far

FIGURE 2: TOP THREE PRIMARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION
(percentage of respondents who ranked each source, single reponse)

Page 12

FEBRUARY 2015

BENCHMARKING PUBLIC DEMAND: RUSSIA’S APPETITE FOR INTERNET CONTROL

the second most mentioned source of information by
Internet non-users followed by central newspapers as
a distant third (36%). Regional Russian TV was also
the second most cited source of information for light
Internet users (41%) albeit at a significantly lower frequency than non-users.
However, in terms of their third overall most popular
source of information, light users cited both central
newspapers (34%) and online news sites (35%) in approximately equal amounts. Heavy Internet users cited
regional Russian TV (32%) and central newspapers
(22%) with much lower frequency in compared to the
other two Internet use segments. Instead, heavy Internet users were significantly more likely to mention
online news sites (52%) and online social networks
(46%). All in all, these survey results suggest the possibility that heavy Internet users may be more likely
to rely on primary sources of information less directly
controlled or influenced by the Russian government as
compared to non-users and light users of the Internet.
How much trust Russians place in different types of
information sources was asked of survey respondents
(see Tables 4 and 5). The types of information sources
were split into two general categories, 1) general news
and information and 2) information about products and
businesses. Not surprisingly, non-users tend to trust
offline sources more than light and heavy Internet
users, except in the case of foreign media, whereas
significantly higher percentages of light (42%) and
heavy (45%) Internet users trusted foreign media as

compared to non-users (34%). Otherwise, TV news,
Russian news in general, and newspapers all enjoyed
very high levels of trust across all three segments.
There was very little difference between light and heavy
users in terms of their trust in online sources of news
and information. For both segments, online sources of
information such as Wikipedia were trusted the most
(85% and 83% of light and heavy users, respectively).
The least trusted online source of general news and
information were online forums and blogs for both light
(53%) and heavy (58%) Internet users.
Turning to commercial sources of information, offline
sources such as tips from friends enjoyed a great deal
of trust (90% or greater for all three segments) from
all respondents, with mass mailings the least trusted
(31-36%) across all three segments. The other notable
variation was for TV advertisements which light (50%)
and heavy (48%) Internet users were more likely to
trust as compared to non-users of the Internet (41%).
As an online source of commercial and product information, 75% of heavy Internet users trust online stores
and shops, their most trusted source of information, as
compared to 61% of light Internet users. In contrast,
the most trusted online source for light Internet users (67%) for commercial or product information were
online customer reviews. Otherwise, light and heavy
Internet users had similar patterns of trust, with least
trusted online sources of information being dating
websites (39% for light, 36% for heavy) and Internet
advertisements (34% for light, 31% for heavy).

TABLE 3: TOP 3 PRIMARY SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents,
mutiple responses)
Frequency of Internet Use
Top 3 Primary Source of Information

% of NonUsers

% of Light
Users

% of Heavy Users

% of All
Respondents

Central TV

88

82

80

84

Regional TV

53

41

32

42

Central newspapers

36

34

22

30

Online news sites

0

35

52

29

Online social networks

0

29

46

26

Regional radio

30

23

18

24

Regional newspapers

34

20

10

21

Central radio

14

9

6

10

Blogs

0

4

7

4

Foreign mass media

0

2

5

2
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TABLE 4: TRUST IN SOURCES OF GENERAL NEWS AND INFORMATION BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of
respondents who cited using source, single response)
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Source

% of Non-Users

% of Light Users

% of Heavy Users

% of All Respondents1

News on TV

94

91

87

90

Russian news sources in
general

89

87

85

87

Newspapers

91

90

81

86

Foreign media in general

34

42

45

43

Folk Encyclopedia on Internet

n.a.

85

83

81

Internet Publications

n.a.

76

78

75

Online social networks

n.a.

69

67

66

Forums and Blogs

n.a.

53

58

55

Internet Sources
1. For non-Internet sources, percentage of all respondents reported, for Internet sources, % of only Internet users reported
(e.g. Wikipedia)
2. n.a. = not applicable

TABLE 5: TRUST IN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCTS AND BUSINESS BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS
(percentage of respondents who cited using source, single response)
Frequency of Internet Use
Type of Source

% of Non-Users

% of Light Users

% of Heavy Users

% of All Respondents1

Tips from friends

90

92

93

92

TV advertisements

41

50

48

46

Mass mailings

31

36

33

34

Internet stores/shops (e.g.
Amazon)

n.a.

61

75

67

Online Customer Reviews

n.a.

67

68

67

Company or organizational
websites

n.a.

63

62

63

Emails from companies and
stores

n.a.

54

49

49

Dating websites

n.a.

39

36

36

Internet advertisements

n.a.

34

31

31

Internet Sources

1. For non-Internet sources, percentage of all respondents reported, for Internet sources, % of only Internet users reported
2. n.a. = not applicable
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Russian Attitudes About the Influence of the
Internet and Dangerous Content
Survey respondents were queried on whether they
perceived the Internet as having an overall positive influence on people’s lives, an overall negative influence,
or no influence at all. In total, about half of Russians
(53%) believe the Internet has a rather positive influence, about one-third (31%) believe it has a rather
negative influence, and the remainder (16%) believe it
does not have any influence on people’s lives.
However, as illustrated in Figure 3, the perceived influence of the Internet varies significantly by frequency of
Internet use. A majority (55%) of non-users perceive
the Internet as having a negative influence on people’s
lives as compared to about half as many light (23%),
and even fewer heavy (15%), Internet users. Conversely, three-fourths of heavy Internet users (76%) perceive
the Internet as having a positive influence, followed by
61% of light Internet users, only one in five (21%) nonusers. About one-quarter of non-users (24%) believe
the Internet has no influence at all, a perception shared

by even fewer light (16%) and heavy (9%) Internet users.
Beyond beliefs about the Internet’s overall positive or
negative influence, Russians were also asked if the Internet posed a threat across five different dimensions,
namely a) threatening Russian political stability, b) substantially increasing the rate of suicides, c) threating
family values, d) threatening the strength of social ties
in Russia, and e) being used as a tool against Russia
by foreign countries. Figure 4 provides the percentages
of Russians that agreed, disagreed, or were indifferent
to these perceived threats of the Internet.
Half or more of Russians disagree that the Internet threatens Russian political stability (50%), family
values (53%), and the Russian social ties (56%). A
plurality (42%) of Russians agrees that the Internet is
being used by foreign countries against Russia. Russians are very split on whether the Internet increases

FIGURE 3: PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNET BY INTERNET USE
SEGMENTS (percentage of respondents who cited using source, single
reponse)
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the rate of suicides, with one-third (33%) agreeing that
it does, about one third indifferent (35%), and one-third
(33%) disagreeing with the idea.
However, opinions about these possible threats from
the Internet vary substantially across the three Internet
use segments as exhibited in Table 6, with non-users
substantially more likely to view the Internet as threatening as compared to light and heavy Internet users.
For instance, a plurality of Internet non-users (39%)
agree that the Internet threatens family values whereas
large majorities of light (62%) and heavy (70%) Internet
users disagree. Also in contrast, one-third of non-users
(33%) agree that the Internet threatens Russia’s political stability as compared to 22% of light and 19% of
heavy Internet users who feel the same.
The perception that the Internet is being used by foreign
governments against Russia has a plurality of agreement among Internet non-users (46%) but opinions are
much more split among light and heavy Internet users. A plurality of light internet users (45%) also agrees
that the Internet is being used against Russia by other

countries but at the same time, 35% disagree. The
idea that the Internet is being used against Russia by
foreign countries finds the least support among heavy
Internet users with the plurality (43%) of heavy users
disagreeing with this perception and about one-third
(36%) agreeing.
In addition to perceptions of influence and threat, survey respondents were asked whether they personally
felt positively or negatively about seventeen specific
types of information being publicly available on the
Internet (see Table 7). These types of information fell
into four broad categories of content: 1) socially or culturally offensive (i.e. pornographic, violent, obscene
language), 2) recruiting information for fringe religious
sects or extremist groups, 3) politically controversial or
illegally downloadable content (i.e. protests, copyrighted material), and 4) information harmful to health and
wellbeing (i.e. how to commit suicide, smoking promotion).
Across all seventeen types of Internet content, Russians felt most negatively about scenes of child abuse

FIGURE 4: PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE INTERNET
(percentage of total respondents, single reponse)
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TABLE 6: PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE INTERNET BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS
(percentage of total respondents, single response)
Frequency of Internet Use
% of Non-Users
Type of Threat

% of Light Users

% of Heavy Users

% Agree

% Disagree

% Agree

% Disagree

% Agree

% Disagree

Internet threatens family
values

39

29

27

62

18

70

Internet threatens demographic situation

29

34

18

67

16

71

Internet threatens political
stability

33

29

22

60

19

63

Internet is used by foreign
countries against Russia

46

17

45

35

36

43

Internet substantially increases the rate of suicide

37

20

34

36

28

42

TABLE 7: FEELINGS TOWARD TYPES OF INTERNET CONTENT (percentage of total respondents, single response)
Valence of Feeling
Type of Internet Content

% Positive

% Indifferent

% Negative

Socially or Culturally Offensive
Scenes of child abuse

1

3

96

Scenes showing the use of drugs

1

4

95

Scenes of aggression, violence, and cruelty to people

2

5

94

Content specific to sexual minorities, such as homosexuality

1

5

94

Violence and cruelty in online games

2

9

90

Pornographic materials

2

9

89

Texts/video/images with obscene language

4

15

82

Calls to join radical or extremist groups

1

6

94

Calls to join religious sects

1

8

91

Calls to join fraudulent business opportunities

2

16

83

Calls to protest against governments and for change of the
current political leadership

2

17

81

Websites and social networking groups that are used to
organize rallies and demonstrations against authorities

3

18

79

Negative information about public officials

5

22

73

Copyrighted video

9

21

70

Information on how to commit suicide

1

5

93

Information about weapons, explosives, and their production

2

9

90

Promotion of smoking, alcohol

2

13

86

Recruiting Information for Fringe Groups

Politically Controversial or Illegal

Harmful to Health or Wellbeing
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(96%), scenes showing drugs (95%), scenes featuring
aggression or violence toward people (94%), content
specific to sexual minorities (94%), and calls to join
radical or extremist organizations (94%). Content that
is politically controversial or illegal was the least objectionable, though a solid majority (70%) felt negatively
about copyrighted video being publicly online and 73%
feeling the same about negative information on public officials. Even more Russians felt negatively toward
websites/social networking groups that organize antigovernment protest activities (79%) and online content
that calls for anti-government protests or changes in
political leadership (81%).
In terms of feelings toward different types of content,
there was consensus across the three Internet use
segments in reporting negative sentiment toward social or cultural content such as scenes showing child
abuse, drug use, aggression, or homosexuality (see
Table 8). However, significant differences in negative
feelings among Russians based on their frequency of
Internet use arose in the cases of violence in video

FEBRUARY 2015

games (95% of non-users vs. 84% of heavy Internet
users), pornographic materials (95% of non-users vs.
85% of heavy Internet users), and content featuring
obscene language (89% of non-users vs. 76% heavy
Internet users).
The other types of content in which there was significant
variation in negative feelings by frequency of Internet
use (again see Table 8) were primarily political or legal.
For example, 89% of non-users felt negatively about
websites or social networking groups that are used to
organize rallies and demonstrations against authorities compared to 72% of heavy Internet users who felt
the same. Likewise, 83% of non-users had negative
feelings about negative information concerning public officials being publicly online as compared to 66%
of heavy Internet users who felt the same. The single
largest difference in negativity among Internet use segments was in the case of copyrighted video material
being publicly available online, with 84% of non-users
feeling negative toward this content compared to only
59% of heavy Internet users.

TABLE 8: NEGATIVE FEELINGS TOWARD TYPES OF INTERNET CONTENT BY INTERNET USE SEGMENT (percentage of
total respondents, single response)
Frequence of Internet Use
Type of Internet Content

% of Non-Users

% of Light Users

% of Heavy Users

Socially or Culturally Offensive
Scenes of child abuse

97

96

96

Scenes showing the use of drugs
Scenes of aggression, violence, and cruelty to people
Content specific to sexual minorities, such as homosexuality
Violence and cruelty in online games
Pornographic materials
Texts/video/images with obscene language
Recruiting Information for Fringe Groups
Calls to join radical or extremist groups
Calls to join religious sects
Calls to join fraudulent business opportunities
Politically Controversial or Illegal
Calls to protest against governments and for change of the
current political leadership
Websites and social networking groups that are used to
organize rallies and demonstrations against authorities
Negative information about public officials
Copyrighted video
Harmful to Health or Wellbeing
Information on how to commit suicide
Information about weapons, explosives, and their production
Promotion of smoking, alcohol

97
96
96
95
95
89

97
95
94
93
88
81

93
92
91
84
85
76

96
94
89

95
91
82

91
89
78

86

80

77

89

75

72

83
84

71
67

66
59

95
95
90

94
91
87

91
85
81
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Russian Attitudes About Internet
Censorship
Russians were asked an overarching question about
whether information on the Internet should be distributed freely without any censorship or whether some
censorship by the government is necessary. Figure 5
depicts their preference by frequency of Internet use
segment. Overall, 11% of Russians believe the Internet
should be completely free of government censorship,
though there was substantial variation by frequency of
Internet use. For example, 16% of heavy Internet users do not believe in any government censorship at all
compared to just 5% of non-users.
Almost half (49%) of all Russians believe that information on the Internet needs to be censored, and again
this percentage varied substantially by Internet use.
Fifty-seven percent of Internet non-users believe information online needs to be censored by the government

as compared to a significantly lower 43% of heavy Internet users. The percentage of Russians who believe
government censorship depends on the type of content
in question is at 40%, with no significant variation in
percentages across the three Internet use segments.
Russians were asked two sets of questions asking
what types of online content specifically should be
censored or blocked by the Russian government. The
first asked Internet users to choose up to three types
of Internet content that the Russian government should
censor (see Figure 6). The top three most cited types
of content were copyrighted material (59%), followed
distantly by foreign news media websites (45%) and a
virtual tie for third place between other foreign websites
(38%) and materials promoting ethnic or racist hatred
(37%).

FIGURE 5: OVERARCHING VIEW OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP BY
FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total
respondents, single reponse)
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Differences in preferences for what types of
content to censor varied very little by frequency
of Internet use. The only noteworthy exception
were Russian preferences for government censorship of other foreign websites where 39% of
Internet non-users, 46% of light Internet users,
and 34% of heavy Internet users chose this
this type of content. This lower support among
heavy Internet users for censoring other foreign
media websites is consistent with their lower
levels of belief that the Internet is being used
against Russia by foreign countries and higher
level of trust in foreign media as compared to
Russians in the other two Internet use segments.
The second question asked Russians if they
agreed or disagreed with five specific types of
Internet content being censored or blocked:
1) the video by Pussy Riot, 2) a blogger that
calls for regime change in Russia, (3) a social
network group that is used for organization
of protests against the government, 4) a pornographic website with homosexual content,
5) the website for the group that exposed the
blacklist of blocked websites (see Figure 7).

FIGURE 6: PREFERENCES FOR GENERAL TYPES OF INTERNET CONTENT RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD CENSOR
(percentage of total respondents, multiple reponses)

Among Russians, there is large majority support
for the government to block/censor a website
with homosexual content (59%). Furthermore,
this support is highest among heavy Internet
users (62%), followed by non-users (59%) and
light users (55%). A plurality of Russians agree
that a social network group that is used for organizing anti-government protests (46%), the
video by the anti-government female punk rock
collective Pussy Riot (45%), the website that
exposed the government’s blacklist of blocked
websites (44%), and bloggers that call for regime change (43%).
There is little variation in agreement in censoring these other specific types of online content
by frequency of Internet use except in the case
of the website that exposed the Russian government’s blacklist of blocked websites where
heavy Internet users (48%) are significantly
more likely to agree that the government should
censor this content as compared to light Internet users (39%) and non-users (43%).
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FIGURE 7: PREFERENCES FOR SPECIFC TYPES OF INTERNET
CONTENT R
 USSIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD CENSOR (percentage of total respondents, single reponse)
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Russian Attitudes About Internet Regulation
& Legislation
Survey respondents were asked to rank their top
three institutions or organizations they trusted the
most to regulate the Internet, though 6% of respondents refused to rank any organization and institution
and replied that no one should regulate the Internet.
Sources which garnered at least 10% of responses are
featured in Figure 8 with the percentage that selected
each institution or organization as their most trusted,
second most trusted, and third most trusted regulator
of the Internet presented. The Russian government
and the Russian security service were virtually tied as
the overall trusted regulator of the Internet (42% and
41% respectively), though more Russians ranked the
Russian security service (17%) as their most trusted
regulator of the Internet as compared
to the Russian government (13%).

Internet such as the Russian government (46% vs.
36%), Russian security service (44% vs. 37%), and
the Russian presidency (37% vs. 25%) as compared to
heavy Internet users. In contrast, heavy Internet users,
as compared to non-users, are substantially more likely
to trust regulators of the Internet without official ties to
the Russian government such as private industry (32%
vs. 18%), NGOs and other civil society groups (27%
vs. 14%), and international organizations without ties
to Russian officials (12% to 5%).
Beyond whom they may trust to regulate the Internet, survey respondents were also asked several
questions about their beliefs and preferences about

Researchers (32%) and the President
of Russia (30%) were roughly tied for
the second most trusted regulators of
the Internet, though more Russians
cited the presidency (15%) as their first
choice as compared to researchers
(12%). The Russian Duma (28%) and
private industry (26%) were the third
most overall trusted set of regulators
cited by Russians, followed by 21%
citing NGOs and other civil society
groups and 10% international organizations without Russian officials (e.g.
UN, ICANN). Interestingly, only 2% of
Russians trust the international organizations that work with Russian officials,
such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), to regulate the
Internet (not depicted in Figure 8).
Breaking down by frequency of Internet use Russians’ top choices to
regulate the Internet reveals significant
differences in preferences (see Figure
9). For example, non-users of the Internet as compared to heavy Internet
users are substantially more likely to
cite government institutions or agencies as their trusted regulators of the

FIGURE 8: MOST TRUSTED INSTITUTIONS & ORGANIZATIONS FOR
REGULATING THE INTERNET (percentage of total respondents, multiple
reponses)
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regulatory legislation and policy in Russia. For instance, Russians were asked
what they believed were the government’s
primary motivations when they adopted a
law creating an official global “blacklist” of
international websites and Internet content
that is censored in Russia. Figure 10 depicts responses by frequency of Internet
use segment.

FIGURE 9: TRUSTED INSTITUTIONS & ORGANIZATIONS FOR REGULATING THE INTERNET BY INTERNET USE SEGMENT ( percentage of
total respondents, multiple reponses)

Overall, 51% of Russians believe the primary motivation of the government in
legislating a blacklist of websites is the
maintenance of political stability as opposed to 13% of Russians who believe the
primary motivation was limiting democratic
freedoms. A little over one-third of Russians
(35%) had never heard or was unaware of
the blacklist law. These percentages varied significantly by frequency of Internet
use (see Figure 10 above). Heavy Internet users were more than twice as likely
as non-users (18% vs. 8%) to believe the
primary motivation was to limit democratic
freedoms. In addition, almost half (49%)
of non-users had never heard of the law
as compared to about one-third (34%) of
light users and about one-quarter (23%) of
heavy users.
The question of whether public opinion
should be taken into account by public
bodies when regulating the Internet was
also posed to survey respondents. A majority of Russians (56%) believe the state is
obliged to consider the public’s opinion and
see public advice on Internet regulation.
About one-third of Russians (36%) believe
the state can consider public opinion if it so
wishes but in the end may act according
to its own preferences and 9% of Russians
believe the state should not pay any attention to public opinion when regulating the
Internet.

FIGURE 10: GOVERNMENT MOTIVATION FOR BLACKLIST L
 EGISLATION
BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total
respondents, single reponse)
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However, as Figure 11 above illustrates,
these beliefs also vary by frequency of Internet use. Heavy (62%) and light (58%)
Internet users are substantially more likely
to believe the state is obliged to consider
public opinion and seek public advice
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when regulating the Internet than non-users
(47%). In contrast, significantly more nonusers (43%) than light (34%) and heavy
(30%) Internet users believe the state may
consider public opinion if it so wishes but
may still act as it so chooses.
Russians were also asked via the survey
whether personal blogs should be regulated
more, the same, less than mass media websites, or not at all (see Figure 12). Overall,
a very large percentage of survey respondents had difficulty answering the question,
with nearly one out of five (19%) replying that
it was too difficult to tell. Out the remaining
response options, the plurality of Russians
(39%) believe personal blogs should be regulated the same as mass media websites.
Otherwise, opinions are about equally split,
with 15% of Russians believing personal
blogs should be regulated less than mass
media websites, 13% believe they should
be regulated more, and 14% believe they
should not be regulated at all.

FIGURE 11: REGULATORY ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION BY FREQUENCY
OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents,
single reponse)

FIGURE 12: BELIEFS ABOUT REGULATION OF PERSONAL BLOGS BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE
SEGMENTS (percentage of total respondents, single reponse)
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Russian Citizen Mobilization and Protest
Russian Internet users (62% of survey respondents)
were asked a series of questions about citizen mobilization and protest in furtherance of Internet freedom.
Whether Internet users considered themselves personally impacted by Internet regulation was assessed by
asking survey respondents if they agreed or disagreed
with the statement “the regulation of the Internet affects
my personal freedom.” A majority of Russian Internet
users (59%) disagreed with the statement and felt that
they are not personally impacted by Internet regulation
while 41% believe that they are impacted by regulation.
If there was a possibility of a mass protest or demonstration against government measures to restrict or
censor the Internet in their local community was also
asked of Russian Internet users. A follow-up question
then asked if respondents would personally take part in
such mobilization if it occurred.
The results depicted in Figure 13 show that 14% of all
Russian Internet users believe protests against Internet censorship in their community are possible with no
significant differences between light (12%) and heavy
(15%) Internet users. In addition, about one in ten (9%)
Internet users reply they would take part in such protests if they occurred, with heavy Internet users (11%)
almost three times as likely to protest than light users
(4%).
The survey also asked Russian Internet users to select
up to three types of Russian government censorship of
or restrictions on the Internet that may motivate to them
to engage in mass citizen mobilization and protest in
defense of Internet freedom. Figure 14 lists their most
popular selections that garnered at least 7% of men-

tions. Russian Internet users (40%) overwhelmingly
cited a complete ban on the use of the Internet such
as exists within the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (i.e. North Korea) as a reason to mobilize and
protest. Unfortunately, at the same time, about onequarter (27%) of all Russian Internet users could not
cite any type of Internet censorship or restrictions that
would lead them to protest or mobilize in defense of
Internet freedom.
All the other reasons for protest were selected by about
11% or less of Internet users. For instance, 11% of Internet users selected a complete ban on the Internet in
the workplace and 9% cited the prohibition of the use
of the Internet without personal identification as reasons for protest. Four types of Internet restrictions were
all mentioned by 7% of Internet users: a) the government being allowed to remove any type of content from
the Internet, b) the banning of personal blogs or social
media sites of opinion, cultural, or opposition, c) the
prohibition of nicknames and mandatory registration in
online social networks, and d) temporarily shutting off
the Internet in the event of a protest.
Russian Internet users were also asked if they
had heard about a new legal requirement that new
websites should be registered with the Russian government agency that manages online communications
(called the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media,
“Roskomnadzor” in Russian). Overall, 18% of Russian Internet users replied that they had heard of the
requirement, though heavy Internet users (21%) were
almost twice as likely as light Internet users (13%) to be
aware of it.

FIGURE 13: BELIEFS ABOUT INTERNET PROTESTS BY FREQUENCY OF INTERNET
USE SEGMENTS (percentage of Internet users, single reponse)
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Out of these Internet users who
had heard of the law, a rather
large majority (70%) supported
the law, a small minority (20%)
opposed it, and 10% of Internet
Russians did not know either
way (see Figure 15). Nearly
two out of five (37%) of Internet
users who had heard of the law
and opposed it (representing
7% of all Internet users) said
they were either prepared to
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sign an Internet petition against the requirement (26%)
or participate in offline protests or rallies (11%).
Russian Internet users were also asked under what
circumstance they would or would not support the Russian government temporarily shutting down the entire
Internet within Russia. Figure 16 provides the distribution of responses. Overall, 58% of Internet users would

be in support of such a shutdown, with the case of a
national emergency garnering the most support (48%)
followed by 9% of Internet users believing a temporary
shutdown would be justified in the case of a mass protest and 1% citing some other reason. In contrast, 42%
of Internet users believe the shutdown of the Internet
by the Russian government is never justified no matter
the situation.

FIGURE 14: TOP REASONS FOR MASS CITIZEN M
 OBILIZATION IN DEFENSE OF INTERNET FREEDOM (percentage of
Internet users, multiple reponses)

FIGURE 15: SUPPORT FOR REQUIRED FEDERAL REGISTRATION FOR ALL RUSSIAN W
 EBSITES (percentage of Internet users aware of law, single r eponse)

FIGURE 16: SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TEMPORARILY SHUTTING THE INTERNET (percentage of Internet
users, single reponse)
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Methodological Notes
The survey population were adults living in the Russian Federation (men and women, 18 years or older). The survey
was administered face to face by the VCIOM Russian Public Opinion Research Center located in Moscow, Russia
(www.wciom.com). The survey employed a multi-stage stratified territorial random sample that included 80 regions of
Russia. Quota sampling within each region at the household level, based on population data from the 2010 Russian
census, was employed to ensure the representativeness of the survey sample based on gender, age, level of education, type of settlement, and employment. The response rate for the survey was 57%. The margin of error (MOE)
does not exceed +/-3.4% at a 99% confidence level for reported results for the entire population, +/- 3.1% MOE at a
95% confidence level for reported results for Internet users, and +/- 4.0% MOE at a 95% confidence level for reported
results of non-users of the Internet.
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